For the ground forces in Zeeland, the third day of the war was marked by deeply conflicting emotions. On the one hand, there was the demoralising spectacle of defeated Dutch troops retreating from the west; on the other, the steady arrival of increasing French formations on the mainland of Walcheren offered a measure of reassurance. For the soldiers manning the two principal defensive lines, however, the former impression was far more tangible than the latter. They witnessed streams of retreating Dutch troops, often without weapons and carrying stories of complete defeat, while scarcely seeing any fresh French formations arriving at the front. Indeed, the Dutch defenders of the Zanddijk Line were confronted with the unsettling sight of their French allies digging in behind them rather than alongside them.
The Dutch troops stationed in the Bath Line witnessed an ever-growing stream of retreating Dutch soldiers who had previously formed the defensive forces in eastern Noord-Brabant. This withdrawal bore little resemblance to an orderly military retreat; it was, quite simply, a "sauve-qui-peut" - every man for himself. The shattered condition of these troops had a profoundly demoralising effect on many of the defenders in the Bath Line, including officers and non-commissioned officers. As a result, they feared even more intensely what was still to come..
The troops left behind to defend Noord-Brabant (after the withdrawal of the Dutch III Corps and the Light Division north of the Meuse) were, in many cases, formations of lesser quality and relatively advanced average age. In itself, this decision was understandable. As noted earlier, the Dutch High Command regarded the Peel-Raam Line as being of limited defensive value. Consequently, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief had decided that, in the event of a German invasion, III Corps and the Light Division would withdraw into Fortress Holland. The remaining forces - generally only a battalion in each regimental sector of the line - were, in effect, regarded as sacrificial units. They were reinforced by battalions assigned to the sacrificial zones, formations that frequently consisted of older reservists.
Some of the retreating troops had indeed seen combat along the Meuse, at the Peel-Raam Line, or in the improvised defences around Tilburg. The majority, however, came from sectors that had remained untouched by battle; they had merely obeyed the order to retreat and simply never stopped withdrawing. Their comrades who had actually engaged the Germans rarely succeeded in regrouping and conducting an orderly retreat. Most had been overtaken by the rapid German advance.
Of the battalions that managed to disengage successfully from the advancing German divisions in Noord-Brabant, the greater part fled toward Zeeland. Although many of these troops had not experienced direct combat - having occupied the extensive sectors of the Peel-Raam Line that were never attacked - they had nevertheless endured relentless Luftwaffe raids on the crowded Brabant roads. It was primarily these repeated strafing attacks, combined with occasional bombing raids, that shattered their morale. They saw scarcely any Allied aircraft overhead, and Dutch aircraft crossed the Meuse only once after the opening hours of the war. Many of the men felt abandoned and betrayed by their High Command in virtually every respect. And under such circumstances, could they truly be blamed?
In addition to the main route into Zeeland, considerable numbers of Dutch troops also attempted to cross the border into Belgium. Some of these men would eventually make their way to France, while around 600 ultimately succeeded in reaching the United Kingdom safely. Together with a later group arriving from Zeeland, they would form the backbone of the Dutch Brigade - the Prinses Irene Brigade - and Dutch Commando Troop No. 2, both of which were later established in England. Needless to say, many of these men were only poorly trained and often lacked motivation to resume military service after their experiences in 1940. It took years of preparation and retraining before they were once again fit for combat. Only a relatively small number proved capable of contributing to the Allied war effort before D-Day. Nevertheless, when the Dutch brigade — which in reality never reached the full strength normally associated with a brigade — was committed to the front in July 1944 under British command, it demonstrated its worth on several occasions in both France and the Netherlands. By then, they had at last become fine soldiers!
The senior Dutch officers on Walcheren, confronted with the seemingly endless stream of disorganised troops arriving from Noord-Brabant, were deeply shocked by the condition of these men. There was scarcely any distinction left between soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers; virtually all appeared exhausted, demoralised, and shattered. Most had either lost or discarded their weapons, while their equipment and material had almost entirely disappeared. Many looked as though they had passed through a genuine inferno. Officers frequently travelled separately from their units, with the result that entire companies arrived without a single officer among them — a clear indication of inadequate command and leadership.
The acting commander of the Brabant formations, Lieutenant-Colonel Themann of the 30th Infantry Regiment - following the capture of the Territorial Commander Colonel Schmidt and his staff north of Tilburg - reported to the Zeeland headquarters in an equally troubling state of mind. He spread news at least as alarming as the stories carried by his troops. Rear Admiral Van der Stad was shocked and deeply disturbed by both the physical and mental condition of this senior officer. Nevertheless, due to the lack of senior commanders available, Van der Stad instructed Themann to reorganise the scattered troops and restore them to a condition in which they could once again function as serviceable units.
At the same time, however, Van der Stad realised that the chances of successfully reconstituting this chaotic collection of scattered formations were virtually nonexistent. The ever-growing mass of troops - eventually numbering around 4,000 men on Walcheren alone - consisted of personnel from at least one hundred different smaller units, many of which were missing large numbers of men as well as their commanding officers. The shortage of weapons and ammo could not be remedied from the limited depots available in Zeeland, while the morale of the vast majority had deteriorated so badly that Van der Stad feared they would ultimately do more harm than good to the defence of Walcheren. Events would soon prove him correct!
The French High Command had meanwhile come to realise that the operational plan for their Seventh Army could no longer be executed as originally intended. The extremely rapid German advance through Noord-Brabant and along the Belgian Albert Canal deprived the French of any opportunity to establish a solid and properly prepared defensive screen around Turnhout and Tilburg on Dutch territory. By the early second day of the war, Belgium’s first major defensive line along the Albert Canal had already collapsed under the pressure of the Eben-Emael fortress airborne raid and two German armoured divisions, supported by overwhelming air attacks. The Belgian Army consequently began a full-scale withdrawal toward the KW Line.
Had General Gamelin persisted with his original orders for his Seventh Army, it would almost certainly have resulted in this substantial force being cut off in the far north. He therefore ordered the main body of the Seventh Army to halt at Antwerp and deploy there, while designating the area east of Breda as the most forward and northern limit of occupation. The French units already operating in the Netherlands were instructed to establish an improvised defensive screen around the Western Scheldt and Breda in order to safeguard, as far as possible, the evacuation of ships and troops from Antwerp. As a consequence of this decision, the defence of Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren received increasing French attention, since French strategic interests had now begun to align more closely with those of the Dutch. At the same time, however, it was decided that Breda itself would not be defended in earnest, despite the fact that its civilian population was still being evacuated at local French insistence. The main French forces would instead withdraw toward Bergen op Zoom and the Antwerp region, while only a thin screen of troops around Breda would cover this retreat.
The occupation of the Bath Line was accompanied by another rare display of Allied air power, as already briefly mentioned in the former chapter. At around 19:00 hours, a squadron of French Morane-Saulnier MS.406 fighters of GC III/3 intercepted a formation of returning German Heinkel He 111 bombers from 3./KGr 126, just a few kilometres east of the Dutch positions. The German bombers attempted to evade the French fighters, but for three of them the effort proved futile. The first aircraft, He 111 4W+AW, crashed at Calfven near the Belgian border. The second was shot down near Hoogerheide. The final victim - the squadron leader’s aircraft - plunged into the ground near Korteven, killing all five crew members on board. None of the French fighters was lost in the engagement. The forces on the ground felt their moral being boosted by the witnessed events. How long would that last?