The website War Over Holland was created and is maintained by Allert M.A. Goossens, a Dutch military historian specialising in the events of May 1940 and the political and military developments that preceded the German invasion.
This website forms part of a wider collection of websites devoted to the May 1940 campaign in the Netherlands. These websites were created and are managed by the Dutch foundation Kennispunt Mei 1940. War Over Holland is the only website in this collection published entirely in English. The (mainly Dutch-language) sister websites https//www.maaslinie-mei1940.nl and https://www.zuidfront-holland1940.nl focus on specific theatres of the May Campaign. War Over Holland, by contrast, covers the entire battle for the Netherlands in May 1940, including the fighting in Zeeland, which continued after the capitulation of the main Dutch armed forces on 15 May 1940.
All these websites are owned and managed by members of the Dutch foundation Kennispunt Mei 1940, which may be translated as the “May 1940 Knowledge Centre.” The foundation developed from the well-known Dutch foundation De Greb, which continues to focus on the Battle of the Grebbeberg Battle of the Grebbeberg and the fighting along the neighbouring Betuwe Line.
In 2022, the author of this website published the English-language book "May 1940 – War over Holland (Winkelmans Witzkrieg)". Although its title closely resembles that of this website, the book concentrates primarily on the strategic dimensions of the 1940 campaign in the Netherlands and the developments that preceded it. Particular attention is given to the period from 1935 to 1940, during which Dutch defence strategy was formed and repeatedly revised, and to the operational phase that began with the German invasion. The book examines how the Dutch high command responded to the rapidly changing military situation and attempted to adapt its strategy once war had become a reality
The book is available from the publisher behind this link.
The author has long been struck by the poor - and often inaccurate - coverage of the Battle of the Netherlands in May 1940 in foreign publications. Many historians outside the Netherlands appear to treat the Dutch campaign as little more than a peripheral episode of the far more decisive Battle of France. Yet the campaign in the Netherlands formed an integral part of the German Westfeldzug, and more specifically of its first stage, Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). Indeed, the French decision to commit their highly capable Seventh Army to the Dutch-Belgian frontier, rather than retaining it as the strategic reserve of the main Allied front, may well have influenced the outcome of the campaign. When the German breakthrough at Sedan occurred, that army was no longer available where it was most urgently needed.
One of the most remarkable aspects of the German invasion of the Netherlands was the unprecedented use of large-scale airborne and air-landing operations deep within the Dutch defensive heartland. This innovative operation has attracted considerable attention from foreign authors - far more than any other aspect of the Dutch campaign. Ironically, it is this very operation that has so often been misunderstood or superficially described in foreign literature. Its significance extended far beyond being the first operation of its kind on such a scale. It inspired the Allied powers to establish their own airborne forces and, perhaps more importantly, served as the conceptual blueprint for the Allied operation Market Garden in September 1944.
The similarities are striking. In May 1940, the German XXVI Army Corps advanced rapidly through the southern Netherlands to relieve lightly armed airborne and air-landing forces holding the key bridges at Moerdijk, Dordrecht and Rotterdam. Four years later, British XXX Corps raced along virtually the same land-route in an attempt to relieve the American airborne divisions and, above all, the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Had Montgomery (or the actual operational designer, Brereton) - or indeed any senior Allied commander - understood the German operation of May 1940 in its true operational detail, rather than through the distorted lens of wartime propaganda, they might have regarded it as a warning from history rather than as a model worthy of repetition. Likewise, had the Allies fully appreciated the lessons of the German offensive through the Ardennes in May 1940, they might not have underestimated the possibility of a similar offensive in December 1944, albeit that Patton had predicted it to some extent.
The German airborne successes in the Netherlands have often been portrayed as a triumph of German military prowess. In reality, they were at least as much the consequence of Dutch shortcomings as of German excellence. It was primarily the failures of the Dutch defence that enabled German success, rather than the airborne troops defeating a well-prepared opponent by force of arms alone. Even the German high command recognised this. They understood that a well-organised and properly prepared defender would almost certainly have defeated the lightly equipped airborne and air-landing formations.
The subsequent invasion of Crete confirmed these concerns. Although the Germans achieved strategic victory, the enormous losses suffered by the Fallschirmjäger effectively ended their role as a strategic airborne force. Thereafter, German airborne troops were no longer employed in major airborne assaults, but fought predominantly as elite infantry.
The Western Allies, for their part, required a succession of costly airborne operations before reaching much the same conclusion: large-scale airborne operations offered only limited strategic value and were generally more effective when employed in support of lower-level tactical objectives or as specialised commando-style operations. Tragically, thousands of Allied airborne soldiers paid for that lesson with their lives before this reality was fully recognised. Had Allied planners appreciated the conclusions already reached by the German Heer and Luftwaffe after the campaigns of 1940 and 1941, many of those sacrifices might have been avoided. It proofs that lessons need to be learnt, and those are usually learnt from a realistic hindsight rather than a biased saga.
Even today, many foreign authors - including those who make conscientious use of primary sources and reliable secondary literature - continue to misunderstand important aspects of the Dutch campaign of May 1940. Admittedly, the Dutch struggle lasted only five days and inevitably pales beside the dramatic collapse of France that followed. Yet there is no compelling reason why a campaign of lesser strategic importance should receive less rigorous historical examination than one fought on the main front.
This website is founded on the opposite conviction. Its purpose is to present a comprehensive, carefully researched and balanced account of the Dutch campaign of May 1940, drawing upon the wealth of primary documentation and archival material now available. It is high time that the events of those remarkable days were presented to an international audience with the depth, nuance and accuracy they deserve ...
The author, born in the 1960s, developed a fascination with the history of the Second World War at an early age. During his youth he read many of the standard works on the subject, eventually becoming so familiar with them that large sections were almost committed to memory. Over time, his interest gradually narrowed to the campaigns of May and June 1940 in Western Europe. As a young adult, he began exploring and (copy-)collecting an ever-growing body of primary sources and specialised literature.
In the 1980s the author himself joined the Royal Netherlands Army, serving for several years in two cavalry units. He was first stationed in Germany with a cavalry reconnaissance battalion and later served with a tank battalion in the Netherlands.
The late 1980s and early 1990s inevitably brought a period in which study and career took precedence. Professional education and a demanding career left little time for historical research. The author entered the international procurement and contracting profession within the oil and gas industry, and for many years his career overshadowed his historical pursuits. The passion for military history never disappeared, but the time required to pursue it simply was not available.
During the second half of the 1990s, with his professional career firmly established, the author was able to return to his historical research with renewed determination. Since then, he has assembled an extensive collection of primary sources and archival material. Research has been conducted in archives in The Hague, Freiburg and Washington D.C., while virtually every significant publication relating to the May 1940 campaign has been acquired and studied. Over the years, a broad network of Dutch and international historians has been established, and interviews with veterans have yielded many valuable first-hand accounts, particularly concerning battlefield experiences.
The number of battlefield reports, unit reports, after-action reports and research documents consulted now runs well into the thousands. This remarkable quantity is largely attributable to the extensive Dutch archives, which contain thousands of individual reports submitted by officers and enlisted personnel after the campaign. The holdings of the German Federal Archives in Freiburg have also become considerably more accessible over the years. Whereas they were once difficult to navigate and poorly organised, they have gradually developed into a well-structured research collection.
For the Battle of the Grebbeberg alone, more than six hundred individual Dutch reports have survived. German sources, by contrast, are far less numerous. Partly this reflects the destruction of archives during and after the war, whether through bombing, deliberate destruction or simple neglect. It also stems from differences in reporting procedures. German Gefechtsberichte (battle report) and Kriegstagebücher (unit war diary) were compiled from lower-level reports into official company or battalion reports, after which many of the underlying documents were discarded. Consequently, the modern researcher is fortunate to recover even a single surviving company report. As a result, the number of available German battlefield reports is measured in the hundreds rather than the thousands available on the Dutch side.
Collecting sources is only the beginning. Interpreting them is a discipline in its own right. Approximately half of the surviving Dutch reports contain little of historical value, being either too vague or recording insignificant details. Even among the remainder, only a relatively small proportion contains sufficient & reliable operational detail to permit a reliable reconstruction of events. Yet even these better reports rarely tell the whole story. They often leave significant gaps or contain contradictions that can only be resolved by comparison with reports from other units, opposing forces or independent eyewitnesses. Whenever corresponding German reports survive, they frequently prove invaluable. Contrary to popular expectation, these reports are generally concise, factual and operationally reliable. They tend to be less coloured by emotion than many Dutch or French accounts and often reveal that confusion, friendly-fire incidents, panic and fears of "Fifth Column" activity were by no means unique to the Allied armies, although they were generally (but not always!) managed more effectively within the German command structure.
The study of these thousands of documents demands not only time and perseverance, but also the discipline to approach every source without preconceived conclusions. It is not uncommon for years of research to produce what appears to be a coherent reconstruction of a particular engagement, only for the discovery of a previously unknown primary source to require that interpretation to be revised - or even abandoned entirely. Accepting such corrections is rarely easy. After investing years in studying a subject, every researcher inevitably develops certain expectations and assumptions. Recognising when those assumptions have become prejudices is one of the greatest challenges of historical research.
Whenever the author suspects that his own conclusions may have become too firmly rooted, he will often set a project aside for some time or ask another researcher to review the available evidence independently. In his view, prejudice is the greatest threat to objective historical scholarship. Whether it manifests itself as conscious manipulation of historical facts or as the far subtler tendency to become attached to one's own interpretation, bias must constantly be recognised and resisted, although over-correction is looming too. It is a struggle that never truly ends.
One of the most persistent forms of bias in writing about the Second World War is the tendency to view events through a simplistic "friend & foe" or "good versus evil" perspective. Relatively few historians succeed in setting aside these moral preconceptions when analysing military operations. Yet only by doing so can a researcher begin to understand that historical truth is rarely one-dimensional. Every event has multiple perspectives, and every participant experiences the same battle differently.
Maintaining that intellectual balance is perhaps the most difficult aspect of military history. The internet has greatly expanded opportunities for discussion and the exchange of information, but it has also amplified political bias, nationalism and preconceived narratives. Such influences are not confined to online discussions; they are present throughout historical writing. The author's continuing ambition is therefore not to defend established narratives, but to pursue the historical truth wherever the available evidence may lead
War veterans - whether from the Second World War or any other conflict - deserve the utmost respect. There is, however, an important distinction between respecting those who served and endured the hardships of war, and accepting every recollection or statement they make as historical fact. In some circles, it is considered almost inappropriate to question a veteran's account. That is where respect can turn into reverence, and where historical myths are often born.
Contrary to popular belief, veterans are not always the definitive first-hand sources historians might hope them to be. Most witnessed only a small part of a battle, often without seeing the decisive events or understanding the wider tactical or operational situation. The ordinary soldier rarely occupied a position from which he could comprehend the battle as a whole. Memories are also affected by the passage of time, by trauma and by subsequent experiences. Consequently, only occasionally does a veteran provide a completely new lead or piece of information that fundamentally advances historical research.
Where veterans are truly invaluable is in conveying the human reality of war. They describe the fear, confusion, exhaustion and horror of combat in a way that no operational report or official history ever can. Anyone who is a war veteran him- or herself, or has spent considerable time talking with veterans soon loses any inclination to romanticise war. Their personal accounts strip away every illusion. Yet anyone hoping to reconstruct an entire battle from a handful of veterans' recollections alone is almost certain to be disappointed.
Veterans are also generally far less eager to speak about their wartime experiences than many people assume. Those who frequently appear in television documentaries often represent only a small minority. Most combat veterans remain remarkably reserved about their memories. Many carry them silently for decades.
Over time, the author has met numerous veterans who found the courage to speak openly about their experiences only in the autumn of their lives. Many explained that throughout their working years they had managed to suppress painful memories by concentrating on family, work and the routines of everyday life. Retirement often changed that. With time to reflect, they found themselves returning mentally to those formative years in which war had permanently altered the course of their lives. Nightmares resurfaced. The desire to revisit battlefields, cemeteries or former comrades grew stronger. Equally, many felt an increasing need to tell their story before it was lost forever.
For their spouses, this process could be especially difficult. Many had entered the veteran's life years after the war and had never shared those traumatic experiences. They often discovered, late in life, a part of their partner that had remained hidden for decades. Supporting someone who suddenly feels compelled to confront long-suppressed memories can be emotionally demanding for both.
Such veterans are not always immediately receptive to younger historians. Some decline interview requests outright, while others first seek to determine whether the researcher genuinely understands the historical context of the events they experienced. Once they become convinced that the historian is knowledgeable, respectful and capable of placing their personal experiences within the broader framework of the battle, remarkable conversations can develop. The author's own experience is that interviews on a single engagement have often lasted for many hours, sometimes becoming deeply emotional. Some veterans emerged from these conversations feeling relieved; others found the experience unexpectedly distressing.
Interviewing veterans therefore requires patience, empathy and considerable sensitivity - and moderate expectation from the interviewer. One does not simply begin by asking direct questions about combat. Veterans should determine the pace of the conversation themselves. They must remain in control of how much they wish to reveal and when. Respect for the individual must always take precedence over the historian's desire to gather information. When approached in this manner, the exchange often proves valuable to both parties: the veteran finds an opportunity to share experiences that may have remained unspoken for decades, while the historian gains insight into the personal dimension of war that no archive can provide.
Occasionally, the interview itself becomes a turning point. The author has on several occasions been contacted afterwards by veterans or their spouses, who explained that the conversation had brought about a sense of relief. Some veterans subsequently renewed contact with former comrades, revisited their old regiments or became involved in remembrance organisations. Others introduced their families to aspects of their wartime experiences that had remained hidden throughout their marriage. Yet the opposite has also occurred. Some veterans later admitted that the interview had reopened painful memories they would rather have left undisturbed. Such experiences underline the responsibility that accompanies every interview with a war veteran.
While veterans' accounts deserve great respect, historians should nevertheless avoid overestimating their value as factual evidence for reconstructing military operations. After many decades, memory inevitably becomes less reliable. Trauma, in particular, can profoundly alter recollection. Perhaps the greatest challenge lies in what psychologists now recognise as memory contamination: over time, stories heard from others, events read about in books, documentaries seen on television or repeated conversations with fellow veterans may gradually become interwoven with one's own memories.
The author has encountered numerous veterans who sincerely believed they had participated in events that, upon careful investigation, occurred simultaneously elsewhere and could not possibly have involved them. Such inaccuracies are almost never the result of deliberate exaggeration or self-aggrandisement. On the contrary, the veteran is usually convinced that the recollection is genuine. Human memory is remarkably susceptible to incorporating external information into one's own personal narrative. Anyone who reflects upon stories within their own family or circle of friends will probably recognise similar examples. Over time, memories evolve. Fragments merge, details disappear, and narratives unconsciously become enriched by information acquired long after the original events. Eventually, it becomes exceedingly difficult - sometimes impossible - to distinguish authentic personal recollection from later additions.
For that reason, veteran testimony should neither be dismissed nor accepted uncritically. It is one of the most valuable sources available to the military historian, but only when carefully weighed alongside contemporary documents, operational records, archival material and the accounts of others. Used in that way, veterans' memories add something that official records can never provide: the indispensable human dimension of history.
When this website refers to Germany as the enemy during the period from May 1940 to May 1945, this designation applies solely within the historical context of the Second World War. It reflects the reality of the conflict as it was perceived by the Dutch armed forces, the Dutch people and its government at the time. It is not intended to convey any judgement about present-day Germany or the German people.
The purpose of War Over Holland is to provide an objective, accessible and carefully researched account of the Battle of the Netherlands in May 1940 for an international audience. The website is written with readers from all countries in mind, regardless of the wartime allegiance of their nation or their personal or family connections with any of the belligerents.
For that reason, the terminology used throughout the website has been chosen with care. Expressions such as opponent, belligerent or combatant are generally preferred. The word 'enemy' is used only where it accurately reflects the historical perspective of the individuals or organisations being described at that particular moment. It should always be understood in its contemporary military context and never as an expression of present-day sentiment.
This website aims to present a comprehensive overview of the campaign in the Netherlands during May 1940. The level of detail has been deliberately chosen to strike a balance between accessibility and historical depth. A more concise narrative would risk oversimplifying events and creating an incomplete or even misleading picture. Conversely, a much more detailed treatment - while perhaps appealing to a small group of specialists - would likely overwhelm the majority of readers. The present format therefore represents a conscious compromise between scholarly depth and readability.
The author sincerely hopes that War Over Holland provides visitors with an informative, balanced and engaging introduction to one of the lesser-known campaigns of the Second World War, and that it contributes, in however modest a way, to a broader international understanding of the events of May 1940!
If you would like to contact the author personally, please use the contact page on this website.